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Heaven: The Logic of Eternal Joy, by Jerry L. Walls. New York: Oxford
Uniwrsity Press, 2002. Pp. 240. $35.00.
KEVIN KINGHORN, The Queen's College, Oxford
A decade ago Professor Jerry Walls tackled the neglected topic of hell with
Hell: The Logic of Damnation (1992, Notre Dame Press). In a second major
eschatological work, Walls now takes on the perhaps even more neglected
topic of heaven. In Heaven: The Logic of Eternal Joy one finds a thoughtful
elucidation of the Christian view of heaven, as well as reasons why a doctrine of heaven is indispensable for any adequate Christian theology. One
also finds interesting individual discussions of a number of philosophical
issues, all within a larger exploration of how an orthodox doctrine of heaven provides resources for addressing some notoriously difficult philosophical and existential questions.
Walls spends much of Chapter One challenging David Hume's conclusion that our world seemingly points to a God who is amoral. Walls points
to Hume's acknowledgment that God created us with moral sentiments by
which we naturally approve that which is virtuous and promotes human
happiness. Walls then argues that a God who gave us such moral sentiments, but who did not share these sentiments or care whether they were
finally frustrated, would not be an amoral God but rather a God with a
malevolent moral character. If our options, then, are between a benevolent
God and a malevolent God, Walls maintains that evidential considerations
and, especially, practical considerations make it clear that "the only kind of
God it is reasonable to believe in is a perfectly good one" (28). And given
the thesis that a good and supremely powerful God would not create us
with the kind of aspirations we have and then leave those aspirations
unsatisfied, the author concludes that the Christian idea of God requires a
doctrine of heaven.
Ha ving discussed in Chapter One the connection between heaven and
God's goodness, Walls proceeds in Chapter Two to discuss the connection
between heaven and the nature of salvation. Noting that salvation
involves a process of regeneration so that one is ready for" a heaven of perfect love and fellowship with God," Walls asks about those people who
plead Christ's atonement "but die before they have been thoroughly transformed" (52). The author defends the doctrine of purgatory in response to
this difficulty, offering two reasons why the necessary transformation
could not simply occur in an instant after one's earthly life. First, he maintains that it may be difficult to make sense of the idea of an instantaneous
transition of moral character within essentially temporal beings such as
ourselves. But even if that problem is resolved, Walls argues that such an
instantaneous transformation will typically be incompatible with the kind
of moral freedom God has given us. Developing this line of argument,
Walls contends that the Christian theist has good reason to conclude that
"God has given us incompatibilist or libertarian freedom and that he takes
our fr'2edom very seriously" (54). And he argues that the kind of "legitimate persuasion" that respects others' freedom and value "is accomplished
when the persons involved understand and own the inSight that is
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offered" (55). While the person who pleads Christ's atonement may have a
broad desire at the time of her death to be fully transformed, Walls notes
that "the desire for sanctity may be psychologically compatible with holding on to any number of sins" (56). For one may not recognize one's more
subtle sinful attitudes as indeed sinful or recognize the extent of their
destructive nature. Thus, fully discerning the truth about ourselves and
allowing that truth to "sink into our character" is a mental process "that
requires time for finite minds" (58).
In Chapter Three Walls examines that which distinguishes those who
attain heavenly life from those who in the end do not. He starts from the
premise that" a God of perfect love would do everything he could, short of
overriding freedom, to elicit a positive response from all persons" (67).
Here Walls appeals to the notion of 'optimal grace'-developed in his earlier work on hell-which involves the idea that all people will have the
opportunity at some point to make a fully informed and fully decisive
response to God. From this starting point, the author examines the theological positions of particularism, pluralism and inclusivism. He rejects
particularlism on the grounds that a perfectly loving God would not allow
the contingencies of time, place and historical accident to playa role in
whether God's relationship with any person is finally developed and perfected. Put another way, Walls maintains that it would be morally intolerable for one's eternal salvation to hinge on whether in one's earthly life one
was lucky enough to hear a clear presentation of the gospel message.
Walls then turns to consider pluralism, as the position is developed by
John Hick, but concludes that pluralism is incompatible with orthodox
Christian beliefs and practices and is "altogether unacceptable for anyone
who takes seriously anything like a traditional view of heaven" (79). In the
end, Walls defends inclusivism as a way to reconcile an affirmation of optimal grace with the orthodox Christian teaching that salvation is through
Christ alone. On the inclusivist position-the groundwork for which
Walls provided in his earlier discussions of purgatory-one's fully
informed, fully decisive response to God may well happen after one's
earthly life. Walls acknowledges Hick's objection that inclusivism is an ad
hoc way of salvaging God's goodness in the face of the empirical fact that
many parts of our world remain unevangelized and unredeemed. Yet,
Walls defends inc1usivism as "deeply rooted in the most basic claims of
Christian theism" (81) and notes that it has had considerable support
among Christian writers from the early centuries.
Walls then turns to consider how the doctrine of heaven sheds light on
various philosophical and theological issues. In Chapter Four he examines
personal identity. His stated goal in the chapter is not to defend the notion
of resurrected selves in light of independent philosophical investigations.
Rather, his aim is to show that "the doctrine of heaven is actually a positive
resource for dealing with this classically confounding controversy [of personal identity)" (93). Walls discusses the ways in which Christian affirmations about the survival of the person provide ontological and epistemic
support for the idea that persons are the locus of persisting consciousness
and memory. He then considers the question of how to capture "the substance of what we value in individuals that forms their unique personali-
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ties and makes them the distinctive persons they are" (106). Appealing to
Colin Gunton's contention that the ontological question of identity cannot
be separated from a person's relationships with other persons, Walls
argues that one's identity is constituted by the history of one's relationships-most importantly the relationship with God that develops as one
responds to God's grace.
In Chapter Five Walls focuses on "the problem of 'irredeemable evil' "
(113). Stating his purpose for the chapter, he writes, "1 want to focus on the
particular case of those horrendous evils that seem beyond repair and to
show that heaven is our only hope of resolving these and of providing an
adequate theodicy for those who hold to a rich conception of God's goodness" (117). Walls's central contention is that our tme happiness is secure
as long as our positive relationship with God is maintained. Thus, even
the horrendous evils that do occur in this life cannot destroy the ultimate
source of our happiness. Walls acknowledges, and even presses the point,
that some horrendous evils, such as a tragic death, do seem to sufferers to
represent "the ripping asunder of relationships that were the very fabric of
hopes and dreams and thus of a meaningful life" (116). And he urges that
"The doctrine of heaven, with its resource of eternal transforming grace,
offers the only realistic way of restructuring our lives and reinterpreting all
our past histories in such a way that there is a truly hopeful future for any
of us" (132).
Walls looks in Chapter Six at the phenomenon of near death experiences
and explores whether they provide support for the Christian doctrine of
heaven. He considers the suggestions by various naturalists that such
experiences are merely visions of a 'dying brain.' However, after surveying the contributions in religious epistemology of Alvin Plantinga and
William Alston, Walls concludes that "the work of both of these philosophers give us ground to take [near death experiences] as at least prima
facie evidence for life after death" (160). This chapter marks the one point
where Walls's stated apologetic aim is sometimes not completely clear, as
it is not always obvious how we should read 'prima facie' in reference to
the prima facie evidence stemming from the work of Plantinga and Alston.
Plantinga's work on warrant and proper basicality seems best read as an
argwnent that the rationality of religious belief cannot be separated from
the question of whether God really does exist. On his account, if it is true
that the Christian God does exist and has indeed designed us in such a
way that we form true Christian beliefs in certain situations, then it will
turn out that these beliefs had warrant all along. Perhaps this is prima
facie evidence for Walls's larger project in the sense that, if it is true that
God does exist, then it may turn out that near death experiences were good
evidence for the doctrine of heaven all along. As for Alston's work on perceiving God, Alston has argued that it is prima facie rational to form beliefs
about God in response to experiences of perceiving him if doing so is a
"socially established doxastic practice" (149). Of course, both Alston and
Walls acknowledge that "the prima facie rationality of such beliefs can be
overridden by other considerations" (149}-most notably by different and
incompatible religious beliefs formed by others in response to their own
religious experiences. Thus, one's reasons for preferring a uniquely
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Christian interpretation of religious experiences may well hinge on considerations such as the historic grounds for thinking the claims of the
Christian religion more probably true than the claims of other religions. In
the end, Alston's work seems to be prima facie evidence for Walls's larger
project in the sense that Christian beliefs arising from religious experiences--of which near death experiences are one kind-may constitute one
of the mutually reinforcing parts of a cumulative case argument one might
make for the Christian religion and its doctrine of heaven.
Walls's final chapter is an examination of morality and the meaning of
life. He begins his examination by arguing that nahualism has difficulty
"not only making sense of altruism but also providing us with deeply persuasive moral motivation" (162). He notes that Henry Sidgwick and other
moral philosophers have identified as problematic the relationship
between morality and self-interest, or between what is good for others and
what is good for ourselves. Citing Immanuel Kant's acknowledgment that
"happiness and virtue must correspond if the moral enterprise is to make
sense," Walls argues that in a naturalistic world "there simply is no overriding reason to be moral. At the very least, there is no decisive reason to
do so when it will require us to sustain a net loss in the goods of this life"
(165). Yet, Walls contends, if one allows for the Christian idea of heaven,
then a conflict between altruism and self-interest is simply not a possibility.
For, on the Christian account of things, "we cannot harm our well-being by
obedience to God" and to his commands to serve one another in love (192).
Indeed, it is in the giving of ourselves to God and others "in a relationship
of mutual love, of reciprocal giving and receiving" that we become partakers in the life of the Trinity, where we receive gifts from God that will
always be greater then anything we might sacrifice (199). The picture of
God that emerges from this discussion is an immensely attractive portrait
of a Being who is deeply personal and profoundly loving. In concluding
his discussion Walls does not argue that we should accept his picture of
God and heaven "just because it answers to deeply felt needs." However,
he does maintain that we should not simply dismiss it out of hand because
it does so, for in "assessing the Christian vision of reality," one consideration must surely be whether it provides "an adequate account of who we
are in the depths of our being" (200).
While this book contains a strong defense of the orthodox Christian
understanding of heaven, Walls's unabashed defense of purgatory is
bound to strike many readers-particularly Protestant ones-as theologically controversial. At the same time, his defense of purgatory contains
some of his best lines of argument. While acknowledging that the notion
of purgatory has sometimes been linked with ugly historic disputes such
as the selling of indulgences, Walls insists that Roman Catholics, adherents
of Eastern Orthodoxy and Protestants have reason to affirm the doctrine of
purgatory. Walls begins by referring to Alister McGrath's historic study of
the doctrine of justification in which McGrath notes that justification was
understood throughout the medieval period "as the process by which a
man is made righteous, subsuming the concepts of 'sanctification' and
'regeneration'." McGrath argues that medieval thinkers were faithful to
Augustine on this point, whereas "the Reformers departed from it" (40).
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Walls explains that the Protestant Reformers, or at least some of their followers, "departed from the catholic consensus in seeing justification as a
forensic or legal declaration that the believer is declared righteous, rather
than a process whereby he is actually made righteous" (40). Against those
who would wrongly seek to separate sanctification from justification and
salvation, Walls stresses that salvation "is essentially a matter of loving
God and being rightly related to him ....There is no question of 'going to'
heaven if one is not the sort of person who has the sort of desires and affections for God that heaven satisfies" (40). To support the intrinsic connection between the perfection of one's moral character and the attainment of
heaven, Walls discusses various writers' analyses of standard theories of
the atonement-specifically, penal substitution, moral influence, and sacrifice theories. Walls shows that one thing all these accounts have in common is the necessity of our own moral transformation if heaven is finally to
be attained. Walls's line of argument here, and his accompanying defense
against the charge of works righteousness, is compelling. Whether one
sees his larger argument about the need for purgatory-where moral
transformation can finally be perfected so that one can take part in the
heavenly community-as also compelling will depend on whether one
shares his views about the importance of libertarian freedom and about the
need for an interval of time if we are freely to own the insights that morally
tram.form us. At the very least, Walls has provided a plausible line of
argument for purgatory that cannot easily be dismissed.
Given that this book touches on so many philosophical and theological
topic." it is perhaps to be expected that the reader may wish at times that his
or her own area of specialization had received more in-depth discussion. For
example, in Walls's discussion of naturalistic explanations of near death experiences, he notes that the fact that proximate natural causes may be involved
in these experiences does not mean that God could not still be the approximate cause of them. The neuropsychologist here may wonder what Walls
would make of the claims of some neuroscientists to have generated religious
experiences in experimental studies in which the brain patterns of subjects are
phYSically generated by researchers. To cite another example, in his mscussian of irredeemable evil, Walls maintains that "Christians are encouraged to
hope that not even evils having deep roots in the pernlanence of the past are
beyond the resolution of God's amazingly creative grace" (131). In response,
the moral philosopher may still want to press the question of how redeemed
persons' knowledge that some of their earthly friends have decisively rejected
God would not rob them of perfect and everlasting joy.
Still, Walls is up front about the aims of his various discussions. He
acknowledges, for example, that his goal is not to provide a systematic
theodicy or to offer a knock-down argument for life after death from the
evidence of near death experiences. Instead, he offers the doctrine of heaven as a resource for shedding light on a number of topics; and there are
indeed a number of very interesting discussions within this book. Walls
maintains philosophical rigor throughout--even in those sections that tend
toward more popular apologetic subject matter. Professional philosophers
of religion and serious non-professionals will find Walls's eminently readable treatment of heaven both lively and illuminating.

